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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this study was to examine the relation- 
ship between overinclusive thinking smd creativity, and to 
observe the effects of simultaneous sensory stimulation (SSS) 
on these processes. The hypotheses werei 1) subjects scoring 
high on tests of creativity will also score high on tests of 
overinclusive thinking. 2) simultaneous sensory stimulation 
will significantly increase post-test scores on creativity, 
and 3) simultaneous sensory stimulation will significantly 
increase post-test scores on overinclusiveness. The sample 
consisted of fifty-four Lakehead University students, half 
males and half females. The subjects were randomly divided 
into three groups of eighteen containing nine males and nine 
females in each group. Group 1, the experimental group, 
received SSS for fifteen minutes. Group 2, the quasi-experi- 
mental control group, received the same treatment as the 
experimental but only for three minutesi and Group 3, "the 
control group, received neutral stimulation (NS) for fifteen 
minutes. Subjects were tested both pre- and post-treatment 
on the Goldstein-Scheerer Object Sorting Test (O.S.T.) for 
overinclusiveness and Guilford's Test of Consequences (G.T.C) 
for Creativity . No evidence for a relationship between 
overinclusiveness and creativity was found. Also, SSS had 
ii 
no significant effect on creativity. However, the findings 
did show a partial trend in the predicted direction. No 
significant effect of SSS on overinclusive thinking was 
found by parametric analysis, though a non-parametric 
analysis did indicate that SSS had a significant effect on 
increasing behavioral overinclusioh. Thus, the third hypo- 
thesis was partially supported. 
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Creativity 
Creativity has been a fashionable topic of inquiry among 
psychologists for over twenty years. Yet, it was only in the 
mid-sixties that psychologists began applying scientific re- 
search to the creative dimension of the human potential. 
Morgan (1953) listed 25 definitions of creativity which 
he extracted from the literature. Most of these definitions 
imply that creativity involved the development of something 
new and unique. Spearman (1931) had generated interest in this 
area with his book, Creative Mind. There he defined creativity as 
"the power of the human mind to create new content - by trans- 
ferring relations and thereby generating new correlates ^- 
extends its sphere not only to representation in ideas, but 
also to fully sensuous presentations” (p. 148). Freud (1932) 
suggested that easy accessibility of both primary and secondary 
thought processes was an important feature of the original 
thinker. Kris (1952) elaborated on this speculation to pos- 
tulate that the "effectively original person can regress tem- 
porarily, but could rapidly return to rationality, bringing 
with him the primitive and fantastic modes of thought 
characteristics of the primary processes." This he called 
"Regression in the service of the Ego." (cited from Dykes, 
1972, p. 3). 
Later investigations of artist's and children (e.g,, 
Dudek, 1971» and 1975) Dudek (1971) inferred that the ertlst 
has a greater capacity to regress in the service of the ego 
than the non aurtists. To regress in this sense means to 
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retreat, or dive into earlier often repressed thoughts, smells, 
feelings, experiences, sensations and to insert them into 
the artifact one is working on. 
The Gestalt psychologists defined creativity as an action 
that produces a new idea or insight through imagination rather 
than through reason or logic. Thurstone (1962) similarly 
assumed "that the creative act is characterized by the moment 
of insight which is often preceded by nonverbalized prefocal 
thinking," and that creative thinking "is normally followed by 
implicit and deductive thinking in testing the new idea" 
(p* 52)• These early definitions tended to be unitary in nature 
and they frequently indicated origiias of creativity, such as 
vital.ism, emergentism, serendipity, culture, interpersonal 
relations and personal* Barron (1969) believes that creative 
individuals appear to be both sicker and healthier, psycholo- 
gically, than people in general? or stated differently, they 
are much more troubled psychologically, but they also have far 
greater resources with which to deal with their troubles. 
Psychologists such as Guilford (1967a), view creativity 
as inherent in all persons, qualitatively similar at all levels, 
and, therefore, their concern is with quantitative differences 
relative to the general population norms. Other researchers 
such as Ghiselin (1958), have postulated two kinds of creati- 
vityi creativity manifested by those v^o devote their lives 
to creative ends, and the creativity manifested by the general 
population. Ghiselin*s distinction indicates a qualitative 
difference between the general population and people in the 
creative fields, (cited from Taylor and Getzel*s, 1975# P* 2). 
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Roe (1953)f states that, creativity in both artists and 
scientists, does not coir.e from any sudden inspiration invading 
an idle mind and idle hands, but from the labor of a driven 
person. 
Since there is a great diversity of interests and appro- 
aches in the research of creativity, investigators have tried 
to categorize creativity into various areas. Golann (1963) 
proposed that most of the literature could be organized \mder 
four basic emphasest products, process, measurement and 
personality. 
Dellas and Gaier(1970) similarly suggest that most 
economically the literature on creativity can be classified 
into four major areasi the nature and quality of the product 
createdi the actual expression of the creative acts and the 
continuing process during the creation? the nature of the 
individual? and the environmental factors that tend to init- 
iate and foster creativity. Mackinnon (1970) very aptly 
stated that creativity is a multifaceted phenomenon rather 
than a theoreticail concept to be precisely defined. One ad- 
vantage of considering creativity in this way is that a com- 
plex phenomenon is analyzed into its distinguishable aspects 
or facets, each of \diich is more manageable and more amenable 
to research than is a global concept of creativity. 
Considered in this manner, according to Mackinnon (1970)» 
there are four major facets of creativity1 (l) the creative 
product, (2) the creative process, (3) the creative person, 
and (4) the creative situation. 
The theory of creativity as propounded by Taylor (1972) 
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extends Mackinnon's areas into five fields of investigation. 
These include the creative person, creative problem formulation, 
creative process, creative product, and the creative environ- 
ment. 
Taylor (1972a) describes the creative person as trans- 
active, creative problems as generic, creative processes as 
involving transformations of perceptions and coramimications, 
the resulting creative product as being generative, and finally 
the environment which facilitates creativity as being stimu- 
lating. 
N. O'Neill and G. O’Neill (1974), in their book 
Shifting Gears review the conditions for creativity. They 
conclude that while most of the conditions for creativity re- 
quire a suspension of control, an openess to the inner areas 
of the self, the last and the most important is using our 
will to put what we have discovered into action — just as 
in the shifting gears it is not enough to focus and center 
and make the decision. Without the commitment to action, 
our creativity may never emerge. 
Creativity and Stimulation 
Experimental efforts to stimulate creativity have been 
made both in group and individual activities. The most com- 
monly used techniques include Brainstorming (Osborn, 1963)5 
Synectics (Gordon, 1961); Creative problem solving (Parnes, 
1967)5 Stimulation induced by biofeedback techniques in 
facilitating creativity (Green & Walters, 1971)5 and most 
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directly through the use of simultaneous sensory stimulation 
(Taylor, 1972b), 
But what constitutes a creative climate? What eonditions 
stimulate creativity. Torrance (196?) suggested that a 
situation should provide the following as important factors 
in increasing a person’s productivity, largely in an educational 
setting! respect unusual questions, respect unusual ideas, show 
that ideas have value, provide opport\mities and credit for 
self-initiated learning, and allow performance to occur with- 
out constant threat of evaluation, Maddi (1965) assumes an 
opposing view and suggests that creativity will occur regard- 
less of climate or setting. Sensory stimulation is another 
important variable related to facilitating creativity, Lud- 
wig (1971) points out that in contrast to the abundance of 
research on sensory deprivation, research on sensory overload, 
which appears to be the opposite is essentially non-existent. 
Taylor (1972a) foimd that exposure to intensive SSS over a 
short period of time can facilitate openess and creative 
divergent production, Schachtel (1959) has noted the impact 
of sensory stimuli on the individual, and Murphy (19^7) has 
indicated the importance of sensory stimulation and enrichment 
in providing impetus for creative growth. 
Taylor (1975) has made the following observations! 
The effects of sensory stimulation (Taylor 
1970a, 1972a) can be contrasted with those 
of sensory deprivation (Zubek, 1969) which 
have been extensively studied. One of the 
effects of a creative product is to produce 
stimuliation in the environment. Such motion 
or stimulation produces an attraction or 
novelty for others and facilitates their 
creativity. Stimulation is not as necessary 
for creative transactualization as trans- 
action, generics, transformation and gen- 
eration, but it facilitates these processes. 
There are several reasons why transactuali- 
zation occurs best in an environment which 
is stimulating. First, it is easier to re- 
design an environment that is in motion. 
Second, such an environment allows transfor- 
mations to occur, and finally, stimulation 
is congznient with change, (p. 316). 
Studies by Taylor and Knapp (1971) and Taylor (19?2b) 
indicate that SSS did improve artistic abilities of schizo- 
phrenics, and divergent thinking was increased for a normal 
college group. 
Empirically, therefore, there is justification for 
thinking that SSS can enhance creativity, divergent thinking 
and artistic production, and can be an effective means of 
inducing openess which is a very important aspect of crea- 
tivity. Rogers (I961) describes openess as the opposite of 
psychological defensiveness with each stimulus being freely 
relayed through the nervous system without being distorted 
by defensive processes. 
Overinclusive thinking 
The concept of overinclusive thinking is the outgrowth 
of studies in the field of schizophrenic thought disorder, 
and therefore, it has been seen as a negative attribute by 
many investigators (Cameron, 1938a, 1938b, l'939a, 1939b; 
Payne or Friedlander, 1962; Payne, Mattussek, and George, 
1959J Payne & Caird, 1967; and Broadbent, 1958). 
Among the different viewpoints about schizophrenic 
thinking, Cameron’s concept of ’’overinclusion” (Cameron, 
1939? Cameron and Margaret, 1951) has been one of the most 
promising from a theoretical standpoint and has also been 
subjected to a niamber of empirical studies. 
Cameron (1938a) referred to overinclusive thinking as 
an inability to preserve conceptual boundaries, which results 
in the incorporation of irrelevant ideas, making thinking 
more abstract and lucid.” (p. 213) It has also been des- 
cribed as the patient's difficulty in maintaining the usual 
conceptual boundaries and a tendency to include in one's con- 
cept elements which are not essential but irrelevant (Harrow, 
Himmelhoch, Tucker, Hersh and Quinlan, 1972). Some research- 
ers and clinical psychologists emphasize the fact that over- 
inclusive thinking is also exhibited by obsessionals and 
depressives (Reed, I969). Payne, et al., (1959)9 Payne 
and Hewlett (1960), and Payne (I96I), have extended the 
definition regarding overinclusiveness essentially as an 
attention defects 
the breakdown in a hypothetical filter mech- 
amism^which normally screens out the stimuli, 
both internal and external which are irrele- 
vant to the task in hand, to allow the most 
efficient processing of incoming information. 
(p. 213) 
Since Cameron (1938) first introduced the concept of 
overinclusion, many studies have been performed by psychologists 
to investigate the concept of overinclusive thinking in 
schizophrenics. Lovibond (195^) Rising the Goldstein-Scheerer 
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Object Sorting Test9 found that schizophrenics were rated 
as more overinclusive» and Chapman (1956)9 and Chapman and 
Taylor (1957) report a series of interesting experiments 
which have also confirmed the theory of overinclusive 
thinking* 
Studies by Rashkis, Cushman and Landies (19^6)9 Fisher 
(1950)9 and McGaughran and Morgan (I956), as cited in Payne, 
et, ale (1959)» indicate that studies using sorting tests of 
concept formation have produced similar results. Schizophren- 
ics cannot be regarded as exhibiting concrete thinking in the 
sense of being unable to generalize at all, rather they tend 
to produce unusual generalizations. 
Such findings prompted questions as to what types of 
schisqphrenics were more overinclusive. Payne (1964) found 
that overinclusiveness is typical of the acute phase of illness 
rather than the chronic phase, and that it was clinically asso- 
ciated with delusional thinking. Bauman (1965) reports that 
even normals are overinclusive in thinking, suggesting that 
overinclusive thought is not an abnormality found only in the 
schizophrenics. 
Broen (1968) has differentiated two classes of overin- 
cliision tests, possibly indicating aspects of schizophrenic 
deficits. Payne's tests were designed to examine the subject's 
ability to selectively respond to certain stimuli, whereas, 
the test devised by Chapman (1958), and used by Hawks & Marshall 
(1971a), is seen as a measure of the appropriateness of the 
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response made to one stimulus. 
Other writers, e.g,, Harrow, Himmelhoch, Tucker, Hersh 
and Quinlan (1972), have described three types of overinclusion, 
The first type of overinclusion, which they labelled "behavioral 
overinclusion,” has been studied extensively by Payne, et sQ., 
(i960, 1962a, 1964), The major test used by Harrow, et al, (1972) 
was the Goldstein-Scheerer Test, and they found that the results 
on conceptual overinclusion accounted for twice the percentage 
of variance that was accounted for by behavioral overinclusion 
in a non-schizophrenic group as compared to a schizophrenic 
group. 
In these studies it should be noted that overinclusion was 
seen as an essential characteristic of normal ordered thought. 
The empirical evidence does not confirm the position that over- 
inclusive thought in itself is pathological;• 
A study by Payne, Ancevich and Laverty (1963)9 showed 
that formerly deluded schizophrenics were not significantly 
more overinclusive in their performances on the object sorting 
test than normals. It was inferred from these results that 
overinclusion was a symptom of schizophrenia and that remission 
of overinclusive thinking was a sign of good prognosis. 
More recently the utility of the concept of overinclusive- 
ness has been criticized by several theorists and investigators 
on both methodological and theoretical grounds. 
Bauman & Murray (1968) and Andreasen and Powers (1975) 
suggest that overinclusiveness can also be studied in relation 
to healthy processes« Based on Bauman’s (1965) research, 
’’overinclusive thinking is the ability to make new and un- 
usual associations, rather than a pathological inability to 
filter out irrelevant associations" (po 56)• 
The question arisesi Does overinclusion define a 
abnoranal cogaitive style? Rawling (1975) statess 
If overinclusion is to be proposed as 
describing the essential nature of the schi- 
zophrenic thought disorder, then it must be 
shown that overinclusion does not character- 
ize normal, ordered thought. 
To establish this requires some knowledge 
of hypothesis of the form, that normal thought 
takes. However, as Rodnick (196?) has pointed 
out, nominalist definitions of the symptomatic 
behaviour of schizophrenics have tended to 
appear where a knowledge of the form of nor- 
mal behaviour is lacking. 
’In the absence of a satisfactory theor- 
etical model (of behaviour), the empirical in- 
vestigator of psychopathology of schizophrenia 
is usually forced to confine his inquiry to one 
particular facet or attribute of psychological 
functioning, with insufficient regard for other 
attributes. He is not sure whether what he is 
describing is of primary significance to the 
disorder, or only of secondary import as a de- 
rivative of other, more basic attributes.’ 
(p. 175). 
’Little research has been carried out by 
Payne and his colleagues to establish whether 
overinclusive thought is in fact, pathological. 
The only study directed towards this is one by 
Pajme, Anchevich and Laverty (1963)9 in which 
it was found that formerly deluded schizophren- 
ics were not significantly more overinclusive 
in their performance on an object sorting test than 
normals. It was inferred from this result that 
overinclusion was a symptom of schizophrenia and^ 
that remission of overinclusive thinking was a sign 
of good prognosis. However, firm support for this 
inference can only come from a study that shows 
that the now-recovered schizophrenics were sign- 
ificantly more overinclusive during their illness.’ 
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"If this was not the case, then it is possible that 
overinclusion describes a relatively normal ( in the 
statistical sense ) cognitive style. A series of studies by 
McConaghy (1959) suggests that this is the case. He found 
that, even in recovered schizophrenics, a characteristic 
"looseness'* of thinking remained, but this type of thinking 
did not preclude assimilation into normal society, McConaghy, 
apparently realizing that it may be unwise to assume that 
the formal laws of logic characterize the thinking of normal 
people, suggested that the looseness summarized by the 
concept of overinclusion may relate to a non-pathological 
cognitive style. In support of this hypothesis, McConaghy 
and Clancy (1968) found no evidence of schizophrenia in 
university students whose thinking, as rated on an Object 
Sorting Test (Lovibond, 195^)» was characteristically 
loose." (p. 66-6?). 
The assumption behind the present study was to test the 
prediction that overinclusion is a particular kind of cognitive 
style, which could be observed in creative people. The purpose 
of this research was to investigate the effects of Simultaneous 
Sensory Stimulation oh overlncluslveness and creativity. 
From the perspective of overlncluslveness as a positive 
process, the following three hypotheses were formulatedi 
First, subjects scoring high on tests of creativity will 
also score high on tests of overlncluslve thinking. The 
underlying assumption of this hypothesis was supported by 
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Andreasen and Powers (1975). Their research indicates con- 
siderable overinclusive thinking for creative writers 9 based 
on the quantity of objects sorted9 and conceptual overinclu- 
siveness on the Goldstein-Scheerer Test, 
Second 9 Simultaneous Sensory Stimulation (SSS) will 
significantly increase post-test creativity scores. This 
hypothesis was supported in studies by Taylor (1970 and 1972a) 
and Taylor and Knapp (1971). Since this research examines the 
relationship between overinclusiveness and creativity, the 
above hypothesis will be replicated as being relevant to the 
proposed experimental design. 
Third, it was hypothesized that Simultaneous Sensory 
Stimulation (SSS) will significantly increase overinclusive- 
ness as measured on the post-test. Since overinclusiveness 
has been viewed as a positive attribute, and research evidence 
indicates that SSS has a significant effect on other positive 
attributes such as divergent thinking, originality and crea- 
tivity, it is reasonable to assume that SSS should also 
enhance overinclusive thinking. 
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Since the effects of SSS on overinclusive thinking in creative 
people have not been investigated, research in this area would 
be a contribution to the areas of both creativity and overinclu^ 
sive thinking. 
METHOD 
Sub.iects aind Design 
Fifty-four volunteer subjects were drawn from the students 
at Lakehead University, A representative group of students 
whose ages ranged from 20 to years were selected for this 
experiment. All subjects were screened for epilepsy and drug- 
takings as a precaution against epileptic seizures and drug 
reactions that might result from the SSS treatment. 
The subjects were randomly assigned to three groups of 
eighteen. Each of these groups had nine mailes and nine females, 
so as to control for sex differences. Group 1, the experimental 
group, received SSS for fifteen minutes. Group 2, the quasi- 
experimental control group, received the same treatment as 
the experimental group but only for three minutesf and Group 3» 
the control group received neutral stimulation (NS), 
There were three conditions of the independent variable 
of stimulation, i.e,, simultaneous sensory stimulation (SSS^) 
full session, (SSS2) short session, and neutral stimulation 
(NS), The dependent variables were performance scores on 
creativity as measured by the Guilford’s Test of Consequences 
(1958), and scores on overinclusion as measured by Goldstein- 
Scheerer Object Sorting Test (19^1)• 
The rationale for the quasi-experimental control group 
was to control for the effects of demand characteristics and 
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expectations of the subjects. 
Tests and Apparatus 
The Goldstein-Scheerer Object Sorting Test (O.S.T., 
19^1) was used to measure overinclusive thinking, A 
slightly modified version of the test was used in order to 
obtain three measures of overinclusivenessi behavioral over^ 
inclusion, conceptual overinclusion, and richness of 
association. 
The test consisted of thirty-seven objects. The subject 
was presented with an object (called the "starting object”) 
and asked to sort all the other objects that he thought 
belonged with it. This experiment thus requires the subject 
to build a concept around the initial object. After the 
subject had completed the sorting for the starting object, 
he was asked to give reasons for his selections, this proce- 
dure was followed with all seven starting objects. 
The seven objects that were used as "starting points” 
were* (1) the sink stopper, (2) the fork, (3) the pipe, 
(4) the bicycle bell, (5) the red paper circle, (6) the 
pliers, and (7) the red rubber ball. 
The measures of overinclusion were (l) behavioral 
overinclusion based entirely on the quantitative aspects of 
the person's overt performance, e.g,, the sum of the number of 
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objects sorted with all seven starting objects, (2) con- 
ceptual overinclusion based on subjects overt behavior, 
and the reasons or thinking responsible for this behavior. 
The score for this is rated on a scale from 1 to 5i with the 
overall rating based on a composite of the subjects performance 
during the seven different sortings. High scores on conceptual 
overinclusion are assigned for responses that will involve* 
(a) attempting to force fit an object into a chosen dim.ension 
of the starting'object which does not really belong in that 
dimension of sorting objects (e.g., for SO* red paper 
circle - using the category "round" and sorting spoon, pliers, 
and candle as "roundish"); (b) using a vague, more distantly 
related concept as a categorizing principle when there are 
obviously closely related and more relevant concepts available 
(e.g., for SO* pipe - sorting objects which can burn); (c) 
arbitrarily changing starting points in the "*'idst of sorting 
and using one of the already sorted objects as a basis for 
subsequent sorting (e.g., for SO* fork - sorting knife and 
spoon as silverware, then focusing on the knife, thereafter 
sorting objects which can be cut; and (d) using several disten- 
sions of the original starting object without seeming to rec- 
ognize that each dimension is discrete (e.g., for SO* sink 
stopper - sorting in hit and miss fashion the fork, pliers, 
plate and lock, with the implied categories, "items washed in 
sink" and "metal objects," not clearly stated). (3) Richness 
Footnote. 
♦SO- Sorting Object. 
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of association, was rpted ^ scale from 1 to 5» Scoring 
was influenced by behavior which indicated originality, crea- 
tivity and richness of associations as follows! (a) Using 
discrete qualities of the starting point which are original 
(not commonly used). (b) Recognizing consistently that the 
starting points offer mahy possible discrete, abstract di- 
mensions from which to construct categorizing principles and 
acting on this recognition, (c) Using for all seven starting 
points discrete, abstract diacnsions without elaboration, (d) 
finding an original and appropriate way in which a remaining 
object may be sorted according to the selected categorizing 
principle. Himmelhoch, Harrow, Tucker & Hersh (1973) 
report an inter-rater reliability of .89 for conceptual over- 
inclusion, and .79 for richness of association. 
The Guilford's Test of Consequences (G.T.C., 195®) was 
used to measure creativity. Two parallel fonns were used 
(Form 1 and Form II) and the subjects were asked to write 
alternate consequences for the test items within a ten minute 
time period. Each form of the G.T.C. yields two scores, 
one for originality and one for ideational fluency. In 
scoring the test, the responses were categorized as being 
either "obvious" or "remote". The number of obvious responses 
provides a measure of ideational fluency, and the number of 
remote responses provides a measure of originality. The test 
has a test-retest reliability coefficient of .86 and .82 for 
obvious and remote scores for the adult population* 
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Blind scoring was used to eliminate the possibility of 
a scoring bias for the experimental and control groups. The 
record booklets were assigned code numbers by a person other 
than the experimenter. 
Simultaneous Sensory Stimulation (SSS) was administered 
in a stimulation chamber. The technique is based on Taylor's 
(1972) research in similar settings - The SSS chamber is a 
dark room with walls and ceilings covered with aluminum foil, 
and colored strobe lights which reflect off the walls and 
ceilings. An Archimedes wheel was used for visual stimulation, 
and an original composition by Carlos Chavez,‘'tocatta for 
Percussion” was played stereophonioally through earphones for 
amditory stimulation. 
The subjects were seated in comfortable heated reclining 
chairs, which vibrate and provide somesthetic and thermal 
stimulation, lozenges were provided for gustatory stimulation? 
and incense for olfactory stimulation (Taylor, 1972b; Taylor, 
Austin and Sutton, 1974). All stimulation occurred simultan- 
eously for a period of 15 minutes. 
The short session of SSS was administered to subjects of 
the quasi-control group under the same laboratory conditions 
as the experimental group. The only difference between the full 
SSS session and short SSS session was duration of stimulation, 
i.e. subjects in the quasi-control group were exposed to a 3 
minute period of SSS and subjects in the experimental group 
were exposed to a fifteen minute period of SSS. However, both 
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groups spent the same amount of time in the chamber. 
Neutral stimulation (NS) was administered in a separate 
adjoining room where subjects listened to a fifteen minute 
taped lecture on "thinking” from a psychology text. 
Procedure 
The experimental procedure was divided into two sessions* 
each session separated by a day. In the first session all 
the subjects were administered the Object Sorting Test and 
the Test of Consequences. The subjects were then randomly 
assigned to three groupsi the experimental group (SSS^)* the 
quasi-experimental control group (SSS2)* and the neutral 
stimulation group (NS). 
The administration of the tests for both the pre- and 
post-treatment sessions was carried out on an individual 
basis. In the second session the subjects were given their 
respective treatments. The subjects for the SSS^ and SSS2 
conditions were introduced to two confederates, and all three 
participants were taken to the stimulation chamber and ad- 
ministered the following instructions. "In this session you 
are about to receive various sensory experiences to see what 
effects they may have on your thinking.” 
The rationale for using the two confederates was to 
create a group environment for the SSS sessions, as research 
evidence indicates that SSS if given to a group is more effec- 
tive than if administered on individual basis(Taylor> 1975). 
The confederates were not tested on tests of creativity and 
overinclusiveness. 
The subjects in the SSSj^ condition were exposed to a 
fifteen minute session of stimulation, whereas the subjects in 
the SSS2 condition were asked to sit in the stimulation 
chamber for the initial six minutes, and for the subsequent 
three minutes they were administered the SSS after which they 
were kept there without the SSS for six minutes and just asked 
to relax. 
The same instructions were provided to the NS group. 
Yet, unlike the other two groups the NS group was administered 
the treatment on an individual basis. The subjects were 
seated in an adjoining room which was furnished with only 
a table and four chairs. Neutral Stimulation (NS), as indicated 
consisted of a fifteen minute recording of a lecture on 
"thinking'' from a psychology book. 
The reasons for not using confederates for the control 
group or the neutral stimulation group was based on the research 
evidence that indicates that neutral stimulation like the 
taped lecture has no differential effect, whether given to 
a group or an individual. 
Immediately after the groups finished their respective 
treatments, they were retested on O.S.T. and form II of the G.T.C. 
On the completion of these tests the subjects were re- 
quired to write what they thought the purpose of the experiment 
was. Subsequently, they were debriefed by the experimenter as 
to the nature and purpose of the experiment. Each of these 
sessions lasted from forty to sixty minutes. 
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FIGURE 1: FLOW DIAGRAM OF EXPERIMENTA4. PROCEDURE 
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Results 
Randomized groups analysis of variance were performed on 
pre-test scores for the two measures of creativity and the three 
measures of overinclusion^ The two measures of creativity as in- 
dicated were originality and ideational fluency on the G*T.C. 
The three measures of overinclusive thinking as indicated were 
based on measures of behavioral overinclusiont conceptual over- 
inculsion, and richness of association from the 0«S^« The analy- 
sis indicated significant main effects for sex, F (1, 48) = 
11.76, 2 <.001 and significant interaction effects for sex 
group on originality as indicated in Table 1. A significant 
main effect is found for sex on ideational fluency F (1, 48) = 
^•53» p <^.01 as indicated in Table 2. 
Since the author was interested in studying the effects 
of treatment on the group, i.e., the extent of change in the 
means of the dependent variables, the rest of the statistical 
analyses were performed on change scores. 
The first hypothesis was tested utilizing the Pearson 
Product-Moment correlation coefficients computed on the pre- 
test scores consisting of two measures of creativity and three 
measures of overinclusion. 
The correlation matrix is shown in Table 3* The cor- 
relations are based on the pre-scores of all subjects and also 
contain the correlation of each of the five measures with 
every other measure. Tests of significance among the five 
measures of the two variables are indicated in Table 3* 
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Table 1 
Complete Analysis of Variance on the Pretest 
Scores for the Originality Measure 
Source of Variation SS DF MS 
Sex 
Group 




















Complete Analysis of Variance on the Pretest 
Scores for the Ideational Fluency Measure 
Source of Variation SS DF MS 
Sex 
Group 




















Pearson Correlation Coefficient IVSatrix 
CR2 OV^ OVg OV^ 
Ideational Behavioral Conceptual Richness of 





Two tailed test 
CRl - Pretest score of the originality measure of creativity. 
CR2 - Pretest score of the ideational fluency measure of creativity. 
OV^ - Pretest score of the behavioral overinclusion. 
OVg - Pretest score of the conceptual overinclusion. 










None of the coorelations between measures of creativity 
and overinclusion were statistically significant. Therefore, 
the first hypotheses stating that subjects scoring high on 
tests of creativity would also score high on tests of over- 
inclusive thinking was not supported. 
To test the second and third hypotheses, separate 3 
(SSSj[ - SSS2 - NS) X 2 (Male X Female) analyses of variance 
were performed for each task because of the different nature 
of the five variables. All these analyses were performed on 
the change scores (post-test — pre-test) for each of the two 
Variables of creativity and three variables of overinclusion. 
The results are indicated in Tables 4, 5f 6, 7# and 8. 
Although the 3X2 analysis of variance performed on 
the dependent variable of behavioral overinclusion shows a close 
to significant effect of sex, F (1, 48) = 3*33» E < *10, and a 
significant effect is obtained of conceptual overinelusion, no 
significant differences were found for the rest of the var- 
iables. 
The breakdown on the change scores for group and sex, 
indicated differences in means for the criterion variable (Diff. 
1), i.e., change scores on the dependent variable of original- 
ity, indicating that most changes occurred in the means for 
the experimental group, presumably because of the adminis- 
tration of SSS. Though there are no statistically significant 
differences, the results indicated in Table 9» suggest a tenden- 
cy for the experimental group to show the largest amount of 
2? 
Table 4 
Complete Analysis of Variance on the Change 
Scores for the Originality Measure of 
Creativity 
Source of Variation SS DF R'!S 
Sex 
Group 


















Complete Analysis of Variance on the Change 
Scores for the Ideational Fluency 
Measure of Creativity 
Source of Variation SS DF MS 
Sex 
Group 



















Complete Analysis of Variance on the Change Scores 
for the Behavioral Overinclusion Measure 
Source of Variance SS DF MS 
Sex 
Group 



















Complete Analysis of Variance on the Change Scores 
for the Conceptual Overinclusion Measure 
Source of Variance SS DF 
Sex 
Group 




















Complete Analysis of Variance on the Change Scores 
for the Richness of Association Measure 
Source of Variation SS DF MS 
Sex 
Group 






1 9.80 .61 
2 42.05 2.62* 




Change Scores on Originality 
Broken Down by Group and by Sex 
Male Female 















change (XSSS^ = 2.22, X = SSS^ - XNS = 2.00). 
The results for the criterion variable (Diff. 2), i.e., 
the dependent variable of ideational fluency, suggest that the 
experimental group showed the largest increase in mean scores 
as indicated in Table 10* (XSSS^ = 1.22, XSSS^ = .22, XNS = .11). 
In terms of behavioral overinclusiveness, there is a ten- 
dency for the experimental group to increase in behavioral over- 
inclusiveness after the administration of SSS as indicated in 
Table 11, (X = 15*56, X = 15*56, X = 6.11, X = 9*78). The 
mean scores on conceptual overinclusiveness and richness of 
association did not show an increase for the experimental group 
as indicated in Table 12 (X = .22, X = 2.72) and Table 13 
(X - - .72, X > 2.33)* 
In addition, two *a priori* orthogonal comparisons were 
performed on the three groups to determine >^ich groups indicate 
the greatest change scores as a result of the treatment. The 
first comparison consisted of a contrast between the Quasi- 
experimental group and the Control group. The second compar- 
ison consisted of a contrast between the Experimental group 
and the combination of Quasi-experimental and Control groups. 
Significant results were established on the first contrast con- 
ducted on the variable of conceptual overinclusion F (1, kS) = 
^*^5, (s .05). 
The results on the second contrast on the variable richness 
of association, were also significant (p <^.05)* These results 
are indicated in Tables 15t 16, 17§ 18 and 19 of Appendix A. 
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Table 10 
Change Scores on Ideational Fluency 
























Change Scores on Behavioral Overinclusion 






Mean Standard EM 
Deviation 
Experimental Group 17*33 3^*^0 
Quasi-Group -2.33 22.75 











Change Scores on Conceptual Overinclusion 








Experimental Group 2.00 4.24 
Quasi-Group -1*33 3*94 













Change Scores on Richness of Associa"tion 




Experimental. Group *11 
Quasi-Group *88 
Control Group «22 
Female 








In addition to the 'a priori* parametric analyses, a 
'post hoc* nonparametric analysis was also performed on 
the three groups, using the Sign test to determine which 
groups indicate the most percentage increase in the number 
of individuals as a result of treatment on variables of 
creativity and overinclusion. Significant results were es- 
tablished for the experimental group on originality, idea- 
tional fluency and behavioral overinclusion. The Quasi-group 
did not show a significant change, but the control group did 
show a significant increase on originality and richness of 
association (p<^.02). These results are indicated in Table 
Ik. 
Table 14 
Non-Parametric Data Showing Percentage of Subjects 









Originality Ideational Behavioral Conceptual Richness of 





















The present study examined the relationship between crea- 
tive and overinclusive thinking in a Canadian university pop^ 
The experiment was conducted to test three hypotheses• 
First, that subjects scoring high on creativity as measured by 
Guilford s Test of Consequences will also score high on over- 
ii^clusion as measured by Goldstein—Scheerer Object Sorting 
Test. This hypothesis was not supported by the findings as 
none of the correlation coefficients between the creativity 
and overinclusiveness measures were statistically significant. 
This finding IS inconsistent with those of Andreasen and Powers 
(1975)» who had theorized the presence of overinciusive 
thinking for creative writers. It is possible that overin- 
clusiveness could perhaps be an attribute of the creative wri- 
ters only and not of creative people in general. Also, if a 
more creative group of individuals had been used, e.g., creative 
writers, artists and architects, the author may have found 
significant correlations between the creativity and overin- 
clusiveness measures. Another explanation that can be offered 
for the lack of support for this hypothesis is that creativity 
and overinclusiveness may be basically two different cognitive 
processes that are independent of each other. 
The second hypothesis, that SSS would produce creative 
outcomes was also not supported by the findings. Although the 
results were partially in the predicted direction as indicated 
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in figures 2 and 3» they were not statistically significant. 
This finding is inconsistent with those of Taylor (1972a), 
using the Guilford Consequences Test and Tuokko (1976) 
the Torrance Test of Creative Thinking. 
The, question arises as to why the increase on measures 
of creativity did not achieve statistical significance, 
especially when the literature indicates that originality 
and ideational fluency are essential manifestations of crea- 
tivity (Wallach, 1970). Wallach concluded that only measures of 
ideational fluency and measures of originality, which place 
no emphasis on evaluation and appropriateness of responses, 
truly represent divergent thinking. The flexibility and 
elaboration measures have much more in common with convergent 
thinking. Various other explanations could be offered for 
these findings. However, the duration of the testing session, 
which resulted in a forty-five minute period between the SSS 
exposure and the administration of the creativity test may 
be an important factor. 
The third hypothesis, that SSS would significantly 
increase overinclusiveness was also not supported the 
results. However, a near significant effect of sex was ob- 
tained on the variable of behavioral overinclusion F = 3.33, 
P<;10. The experimental group also manifested the largest 








































































































































































































-I  L 
kind of excessive behavioral output could be the result of 
overinclusive thinking, and which probably could also be in- 
fluenced by such factors as high energy or drive level and 
increased associative activity. 
However, significant effects of groups were obtained on 
the variable of conceptual overinclusiveness F = 4.67, p^.Ol, 
and near significance on richness of association for the 
control group, F - 2.62, £<^.10, but the results were not in 
the predicted direction. (see figures 5 and 6). In the . 
present study there was evidence of significant effects of 
sex on the pre-test scores on creativity, F = 11,76, p .001, 
and F =6.53, 2 *01, but the analysis on the post-test scores 
did not indicate any significant effect due to sex. However, 
an interesting finding was that females as a group scored 
higher than males on pre-test scores for creativity, and 
males demonstrated a greater increase in creativity after 
the treatment SSS was administered. 
For the pverinclusiveness measures males scored higher 
on pre-test scores, whereas, after being administered SSS, 
males of the Experimental group demonstrated greater increases 
in behavioral and conceptual overinclusiveness. Therefore, 
on the basis of these findings a definite trend emerges in 
favour of sex differences, and it can be construed that si- 
multaneous sensory stimulation has a more positive effect 
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Howevert the nonparametrie analyses performed on the 
data using the Sign Test, indicated a significant increase 
for the experimental group on the factors of originality, 
ideational fluency and behavioral overinclusion (p<.02), 
which is graphically represented in figure ?• Thus the 
second hypothesis, that SSS will increase creativity or 
divergent thinking, i.e., originality and ideational fluency 
was partially supported. 
The experimental group indicated a significant effect 
of SSS on originality and ideational fluency . (p < .02) , and the 
control group indicated a significant effect of NS on originality 
(D < .02), but not for ideational fluenc^r. This indicated that 
ideational fluency is irore sensitive to the effect of simultaneous 
sensory stimulation. 
The elements of ideational fluency and originality are 
emphasized in most definitions of divergent thinking while 
flexibility and elaboration have much more in common with 
convergent thinking (iVallach, 1970). From this point of 
view, the former appear to be specific aspects of creativity, 
and according to the present findings, ideational fluency 
was more sensitive to SSS. 
The third hypothesis was partially supported only to 
the extent that the experimental group demonstrated a sig- 
nificant increase only on behavioral overinclus ion at the 
.02 level, and not on conceptual overinclusion and richness 
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FIGURE 7; PERCENTAGE INCREASE OF SUBJECTS 
ORIGINALITY   BEHAVIORAL OVERINCLUSION 
IDEATIONAL FLUENCY    CONCEPTUAL OVERINCLUSION 
 RICHNESS OF ASSOQATION 
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of association* 
The measure of behavioral overinclusion, it should be 
pointed out, measures one type of excessive behavioral out- 
put which may be influenced by overinclusive thinking, but 
which probably is also influenced by high associative act- 
ivity as a result of SSS. 
Suggestions for further research and conclusions 
Creativity is a complex concept to experimentally examine, 
it would appear that standardized tests may not be the best 
method for assessing it due to variability in subjects ex- 
posed to varying degrees of stimulation. There is a need 
for developing short and sensitive measuring instruments# 
which could be geared to the short-term cognitive effects 
of SSS. ’ 
Future research should attempt to look for ways to 
translate laboratory conditions into real life situations 
in order to provide realistic conditions to stimulate di- 
vergent thinking. 
It would be useful to use designs with two experimental 
groups. The first experimental group could be administered 
a test of creativity and then a test of overinclusion, and 
vice-versa for the second group. In this way, we might be 
able to assess changes in creativity and overinclusion measures 
before the transitory effects of SSS expired. 
It is also suggested that in further research, extremely 
creative groups of individuals should be used for studying 
the differential effects of SSSo 
As mentioned in the introduction, there has been a 
dearth of fruitful psychological experimentation in this 
area. The present findings lead to the following conclusions: 
First, there were no significant correlations found between 
creativity and overinclusive thinking using parametric sta- 
tistics, Secondly, using parametric analyses, no signifi- - 
cant effect of the SSS on creativity was found, however, 
non-parametric analysis did demonstrate a significant 
effect of SSS on creativity. Thirdly, on the basis of the 
parametric analysis, no significant effect of SSS on 
overinclusive thinking was found, but to the contrary, the 
non-parametric analyses did indicate a significant increase 
on behavioral overinclusion due to the SSS. The results 
did, however, suggest partial tendencies which supported 
the validity of the SSS effect. 
It is the task of future research to more fully explore 
the relationship between man and his sensory environment 
and to extend this knowledge to the understanding of creativity. 
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Orthogonal Comparison on the Change 
Scores for Originality 
Pooled Variance Estimates 
Value S. Error T. Value D.F. T. Probability 
Contrast 1 0.55 1.70 0.33 51.0 0.75 
Contrast 2 -1.00 2.95 -0.34 51.0 0.74 
Table 16 
Orthogonal Comparison on the Change 
Scores for Ideational Fluency 
Pooled Variance Estimates 
Value S. Error T. Value D.F. T. Probability 
Contrast 1 -0.11 2.13 -0.05 51.0 





Orthogonal Comparisons on the Change 
Scores for Behavioral Overinclusion 
Pooled Variance Estimate 
Value S. Error T. Value D.F 
CorTtrasTT ~3~6S 0.46 51 To 
Contrast 2 -15.22 13,75 -1.10 51,0 
T, Probability 
—- o', 85 
0.27 
Table 18 
Orthogonal Comparisons on the Change 
Scores for Conceptual Overinclusion 
Pooled Variance Estimate 
Value S, Error T. Value D.F. T, Probability 
Contrast 1 4.11 1.38 










Orthogonal Compiarisons on the Change 
Scores for Richness of Association 
Pooled Variance Estimate 
Value S. Error T. Value D.F. T. Probability 
Contrast 1 1•W 1•37 








NAME OF THE STUDENTi  ____________ 
AGE I   — 
DO YOU OR ANY CLOSE RELATIVE HAVE A HISTORY OP EPILEPSY? 
ARE YOU PRESENTLY TAKING ANY DRUGS OTHER THAN FOR THERAPEUTIC 




I AGREE TO PARTICIPATE IN TWO - 75 MINUTE SESSIONS FOR AN 
EXPERIMENT THAT IS DESIGNED TO STUDY THINKING PROCESSES. 
I UNDERSTAND THAT PROCEDURES DO NOT PRODUCE HARMFUL AFFECTS. 
(STUDENT) 
UPON COMPLETION OF THE EXPERIMENT, THE EXPERIMENTER AGREES TO 






Date Age TOTAL # OBJ. 
65 









9 . Red Pr. p c r Circle 
10. Red Snuccr 
11. ed Poker Chip 
12. Yellov; Poker Chip 
,13.China Do<r 
lA.Toy Clapper 
15. Bicycle Bell 
16. Toy Screvdriver 





22.Bloch v/lth Nail 
23.Sink Stopper 
2A . r.id lock 
25.Padlock with 2 Keys 
26.Rubber Ctr,ar 








!• Sink Stopper 










A. Bicycle Bell 
5. Red Circle 
S. Pliers 
7. Ball 
Conur.oatC : 
